The demand for currency: is the underground economy undermining monetary policy? by Norman N. Bowsher
Since 1960 the currency component of the money
stock has risen at an average 7 percent amiual rate. It
is reasonable that the public, faced with higher prices,
would seek to hold more currency. However, currency
holdings adjusted for changes in consumer prices have
risen at a 2 percent rate since 1960 while real de-
mand deposits have been unchanged on balance. As
a result, currency rose from 25 percent of demand
deposits in 1960 to 29 percent in 1970, to 38 percent
in 1979 (table 1). In late 1979 the average holdings
of currency for a family of five amounted to an
astonishing $2,500.
This greater demand has been readily accommo-
dated since the supply of currency, as provided for in
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, is elastic. In the
U.S. nionetary system, any depositor can obtain more
currency by withdrawing it from deposit balances at
commercial banks. Commercial banks that are mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System, in turn, obtain
currency to restock inventories from their Federal
Reserve District Banks by having their reserve ac-
counts (deposits) charged. Other banks obtain cur-
rency in exchange for deposits at their member
correspondent banks.
Table 1
Currency and Demand Deposit




Year Currency deposits demand depoJts
1939 $ 6.4 S 29.8 .21
1959 28.9 114.8 .25
1960 29.0 114.5 .25
1961 29.1 117.4 .25
1952 30.1 119.6 .25
1963 31.5 122.6 .26
1964 33.5 126.8 .26
1955 35.3 131.8 .27
1966 37.5 137.4 .27
1967 39.4 142.5 .28
1968 42.0 152.8 .27
1969 44.8 161.7 .28
1970 47.7 166.8 .29
1971 51.1 177.7 .29
1972 54.7 190.4 .29
1973 59.3 203.9 .29
1974 64.9 212.8 .30
1975 71.0 218.9 .32
1976 77.8 227.3 .34
1977 84.8 242.6 .35
1978 93,2 259.6 .36
1979 102.3 268.7 .38
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URRENCY holdings of the public have risen at
a brisk pace for many years, reflecting a progressive
expansion in the demand for currency.
The persistent increase of currency into circulation
has been surprising in view of several developments
which discourage its use. Credit cards, for example,
have been substituted for cash in an expanding num-
ber of transactions, and the number of checking ac-
counts and traveler’s checks issued have continued
to grow. Moreover, interest rates have moved to
higher levels, raising the cost of holding wealth in
the form of currency and coin, which does not earnFEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1980
interest. In addition, the possession of currency in
large amounts is risky; it can be lost, destroyed, or
stolen. Holding liquid funds in the form of deposits,
on the other hand, has been virtually free of such
risks since the advent of deposit insurance.
Because of the sustained growth of currency out-
standing relative to demand deposits (chart 1), ques-
tions have arisen about what purposes the currency
serves. More specifically, does this currency support
a huge and growing amount of unreported economic
activity? Moreover, since currency is one major use for
the monetary base, are there other monetary policy
implications of the alleged change in demand for
currency? This article explores the answers to these
questions.
The Use of Currency in Unreported
Activities
Suspicion has arisen that the pronounced growth
in currency relative to demand deposits reflects an
expansion of illegal transactions or other activities
that the participants wish to hide.’ According to Gut-
mann, currency lubricates a vast amount of unre-
ported income and employment, an entire subter-
ranean economy whose total product, estimated to be
almost $200 billion in 1976, exceeded the nation’s en-
tire gross national product in the middle of World
War JJ2
A number of recent developments certainly have
provided increased incentives to conduct unreported
activities, Inflation has increased markedly the effec-
tive income and estate tax rates for most individuals.
For example, a family of four who earned $12,000
in 1977 and who received an 8 percent increase in
income in 1978 owed 21.8 percent more in federal in-
come taxes (using standard deductions) .~ As inflation
pushes individuals into higher effective tax brackets,
it provides an incentive to receive income in forms
that cannot be traced readily. Currency payments, of
course, are less traceable than deposit transfers. In-
creasing regulations, prohibitions, and reporting bur-
dens provide other incentives for unreported transac-
tions. Similarly, certain illegal activities such as drug
‘See “The Underground Economy,” U.S. News & World Re-
port, October 22, 1979, pp. 49-52; also, Susan Harrigan,
“Blemished Boom — Miami is Prospering, Aided by - Latin
Money, illegal Drug Business,” \VaIl Street Journal, Novem-
ber 28, 1979.
2
Peter M. Gutmann, “The Subterranean Economy,” Financial
Analysts Journal (November/December 1977), pp. 26, 27,
34. Also see Peter M. Gutmann, “Statistical Illusions, Mis-
taken Policies,” Challenge (November/December 1979), pp.
14-17.
3
See Alfred L. Malabre, Jr., “As Salaries Climb With Prices,
People Pay More of Income in Taxes Despite Bate Cuts,
Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1979.
dealing, which are almost always
rency, apparently have expanded.
Nearly everyone receives a minor amount of un-
reported income in currency from “friendly” bets, per-
sonal services, garage sales, etc. Any firm or person
who receives currency in a business transaction has
the option of joining, at least in part, the subterranean
economy of unreported income. Such opportunities
exist for many engaged in the professions and those
performing repair work and personal services, where
it is traditional to compensate individuals with cash
payments. Wages for part-time work, especially for
child care and domestic \vorkers, also are frequently
paid in cash.
Since reliable information on currency usage is
unavailable, indirect evidence has been relied on to
support conclusions about the dollar volume of un-
reported transactions. Gutmann’s estimates of “under-
ground” activity financed by currency were based on
several simple relationships and assumptions. He ob-
served that the ratio of currency to demand deposits
had risen markedly. In the five years before World
War II, which he selected as a base for comparison,
the ratio of currency to demand deposits averaged
Chart’
Ratio of Currency to Demand Deposits
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Table 2
Ratio of Currency to Deposits1
Domand Total






1.\lI dali ate ait’,’Ial a~raLze~ ti clatly ftc~nre~‘.ct’pi 9*)
whit
1
t ate end—af—vear data.
21.7 percent. By 1976 this ratio had rktu to :34.1
percent. If the ratio of currency to demand deposits
required to support legal activities had not changed,
the 12.7 percentage-point increase in currency (or
$28.7 billion) over and above the rise in demand
deposits represents funds devoted to increased illegal
activity. Furthermore, if each dollar of currency
used for illegal transactions supports the same amount
of activity as each dollar of money held for legal
purposes ($275.3 billion of demand deposits plus legal
currency produced $1,693 billion of reported GNP in
1976), then the $28.7 billion held for illegal activities
produced an estimated $176 billion of unreported
income.
This estimate is conservative according to Gut-
mann. It makes no allowance for unreported income
in the pre-World War II base period, it takes for
granted that the earlier downward trend in the cur-
rency to demand deposit ratio would not have contin-
ued into the postwar period, it assumes all demand
deposits are held for transactions and none for com-
pensating banks for services rendered, and it ignores
the growth in credit card usage and other currency
saving devices.
Several more recent studies provide support for
the broad Gutmann conclusion that the volume of un-
recorded transactions is indeed substantial, The Inter-
nal Revenue Service, from comprehensive audits of a
sample of tax returns, estimated that unreported in-
come on 1976 individual income tax returns was as
much as $100 billion from legal sources. It also re-
vealed no taxes were paid on an additional $25 billion
to $35 billion of individual income from three types of
criminal activity — narcotics, illegal gambling, and
prostitution.4 One result of this study is that the
4
Estimates of income Unreported on individual income Tax
Returns, Publication Number 1104, Internal Revenue Sen’-
ice (September, 1979).
Treasury is seeking to obtain fuller disclosure of
sizable currency transactions.5
In another study, Feige estimated that unreported
transactions in 1976 totaled $369 billion (and a fan-
tastic $704 billion in 1978) .° He calculated the total
value of all transactions in the economy by using out-
standing stocks of demand deposits and currency and
estimating turnover rates for each. The derived total
transactions series has been expanding faster than
reported income (GNP). Feige used this excess as a
measure of the irregular economy of unreported ac-
tivity. His research into other possible explanations
of the faster growth in transactions than reported
income — changes in relative prices, relative volume
of financial transactions, and the degree of vertical
economic integration — concluded that, if anything,
his estimates were low.
According to Gutmann, the underground economy
for 1976 was about 10 percent of reported gross na-
tional product; the Feige estimate was nearly 22 per-
cent. Using Feige’s calculations, unreported transac-
tions had jumped to roughly 33 percent of GNP by
1978. From just before World War II until 1976,
reported CNP increased at an average 7.8 percent
annual rate; were the subterranean economy in-
cluded, the trend growth rate would have been 8.1
percent according to Gutmann and 8,3 percent ac-
cording to Feige. Feige’s research indicates that from
1976 to 1978 total nominal output, reported and un-
reported, expanded at a 16.9 percent annual rate,
compared with the 11.8 percent rate of reported GNP.
On the other hand, questions have been raised by
other analysts concerning the logic of the assumptions
used in arriving at such large estimates of the sub-
terranean economy. For example, Gutmann’s estimate
ultimately depends on the use of demand deposits
as the yardstick for judging currency growth. Were
the comparison made with total deposits, the results
would have been considerably different.’ Indeed, cur-
rency has changed little relative to total bank deposits
since 1939, which suggests that the growth of demand
deposits has slowed rather than that the growth of
currency has accelerated (table 2). Hence, the subter-
3
”Treasury Study Seeks Stricter Reporting Rules For Large
Currency Transactions,” American Banker, November 30,
1979.
°Edgar L. Feige, “How Big is the Irregular Econoniy?” chal-
lcnge (November/December 1979), pp. 5-13. In the report
Feige observed, “I began this investigation suspecting that
the irregnlar economy \vas smaller than previous estimates
had suggested. I am now convinced that the irregular econ-
omy is indeed of staggering proportions and growing rapidly.”
‘Robert D. Laurent, “Currency and the Subterranean Econ-
omy,” Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago (March/April 1979), pp. 3-6.
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ranean economy may not have grown relative to the
rest of the economy.
Although time deposits are close substitutes for de-
mand deposits and currency for many purposes, the
value of such criticism is uncertain. It seems reason-
able to relate currency to demand deposits for trans-
actions analysis since these two are the only mone-
tary assets that can be directly exchanged for goods
and services; other deposits must first be converted
into currency or demand deposits before they are
spent.
In another criticism Laurent suggested that in-
creases in total transfers of demand deposits and
currency are more indicative of the trend of economic
activity than increases in the outstanding stocks.8 Cer-
tain available data indicate a much larger increase
in the turnover of demand deposits than of currency.
Debits to demand deposit accounts at reporting banks
increased by more than 30 times over the period 1939
to 1976. In marked contrast, according to Laurent,
currency turnover slowed over the same period.
Although there is no firm information on currency
transactions, a rough measure of velocity was in-
ferred by observing currency redeemed and destroyed.
Currency is redeemed and destroyed when the paper
notes show signs of wear, presumably a function of
its use in transactions. From 1937 to 1941, the aver-
age life of the currency destroyed was 3.1 years; in
1976 it was 5.3 years. To some extent, this lengthening
was due to the Federal Reserve’s policy of extending
currency life by screening it less rigorously. But an
examination of data for the early 1970s, before such
policy changes occurred, also shows an increase in
currency life. The combination of the increased de-
posit turnover and a slowing of currency turnover
markedly changes the significance of the relative
growths of the currency and demand deposit stocks.
The growth in the currency stock, viewedin this light,
appears too small to accommodate both the growth in
reported transactions and large expansion in unre-
ported activities.
The Feige study, however, concluded that currency
turnover had accelerated since the forties and early
fifties, not decelerated.°I-Ic noted that the quality of
paper used in currency was improved dramatically
by a melamine-formaldehyde resin additive in 1957.
Tests demonstrated that, after this development, each
bill could be used in nearly twice as many transac-
tions before wearing out.
In addition, Laurent suggested that the rapid
8
Thid.
°Feige, “How Big is the Irregular Economy?’
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Table 3
Ratio of Currency and Demand
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growth in currency out~Iaiidiig is chic, in part, to an
increased use of currency as a store of value.’0 The
increase in large denomination bills suggests hoard-
ing. In fact, there is now more money outstanding in
$100 bills than in any other currency denomination
(larger denominations are no longer issued).
On the other hand, some argue that the abundance
of large denomination notes may just as well indicate
an increased use of currency for illegal activity as
for a store of value. Furthermore, the growth of ille-
gal activity itself increases the stock of currency
hoarded. Reportedly, the large tax evader or drug
dealer frequently accumulates sizable amounts of
currency in the larger denominations, These cash
balances are maintained, despite high interest rates,
to avoid arousing suspicion in converting this cur-
rency into other assets. When it becomes profitable
to do so, the holder may purchase a legitimate busi-
ness to “launder” the illegal gains.
From a casual comparison of the growth of cur-
rency and the expansion of spending, there does not
appear to be a great unexplained rise in currency. In
fact, currency outstanding has expanded at a pace
slightly less than the increase in total recorded spend-
ing on goods and services (see table 3). The marked
rise in the ratio of currency to demand deposits, giv-
ing rise to suspicions of a rapidly expanding under-
ground economy, has reflected sluggish growth in
demand deposits. The lack of demand deposit growth
can be explained by a proliferation of alternatives for
such deposits, including repurchase agreements, NOW
accounts, telephone and automatic transfers between
savings and demand deposits, and money market mu-
tual funds,
‘°Laurent, ‘Currency and the Subterranean Economy.”FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1980
In another examination of currency developments,
Garcia argues that the rapid increase in currency out-
standing should have come as no surprise to fore-
casters of currency demand.11 She notes that, since the
1950s, the amount of currency outstanding has ap-
proximated the predictions based on economic models.
Using the econometric equations developed by Gold-
feld, Garcia found that currency as a function of
reported income, interest rates, and lagged currency
holdings behaved as anticipated, while demand de-
posits rose at a surprisingly slower pace.’2 Hence,
she concludes that the subterranean economy operat-
ing on currency has not grown spectacularly since
the early fifties; more likely it is roughly the same
portion of GNR’3
Gutmann responded to the Garcia study by point-
ing out that an equation may do a satisfactory job of
forecasting without affording much insight into under-
lying causes.14 He faulted the currency equations for
their omission of both a variable proxying the sub-
terranean economy and the implicit yield on demand
deposits. In the latter case, he argued that including
the yield on the closest currency substitute — de-
mand deposits — would, ceteris pan bus, have led to a
forecast of smaller cun-ency growth over the period.
This is because the implicit yield on demand deposits
has risen, or, alternatively, the price of the substitute
has fallen. He claimed that the success of the Goldfold
formulation in predicting currency demand, despite
the omitted variables, is explained by the fact that
(1) both currency and two of the model’s explanatory
variables (CN-P and interest rates) rose rapidly over
the period examined and that (2) the previous
period’s currency was included as an explanatory
variable.’5
“Cillian Garcia, “The Currency Ratio and the Subterranean
Economy,” Financial Analysts Journal (November/Decem-
ber 1978), pp. 64-66, 69. Johannes aad Rasche also found
the currency ratio relatively stable. James M. Johannes and
Robert II. Rasche, “Predicting the Money Multiplier,” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics (July 1979), pp. 301-25.
“Stephen Goldfeld, “The Demand for Money Revisited,”




Other studies have also concluded that the Cutmann and
Feige estimates of the subterranean economy are excessive.
See Richard D. Porter and Stephan S. Thurman, “The Cur-
rency Ratio and The Subterranean Economy: Additional
Comments” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, January 26, 1979, processed); and Richard D. Por-
ter, “Some Notes on Estimating The Underground Econ-
omy,’ (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
August 10, 1979, processed).
t4
Peter M. Gutmann, ‘Professor Gntmann Replies,” Financial
Analysts Journal (November/December 1978), pp. 67-69,
“Including a lagged dependent variable in an equation is a
valid test of the adjustment of actual to desired quantities in
a partial adjustment model.
In brief, it is well known that much income goes
unreported — this has been trne for decades. With-
out more accurate information on currency exchanges,
however, reliable estimates of unreported activities
will be elusive. The great stock of currency outstand-
ing and its persistent expansion in the face of higher
costs of holding currency and the widespread use of
currency substitutes (ag., credit cards) certainly sup-
port suspicions of increasing in-egular transactions.
Moreover, heavier tax burdens and government regu-
lation seem to have provided powerful incentives for
attempting to hide more activities.
On the other hand, currency has not risen as rapidly
as total spending. In addition, the velocity of demand
deposits has increased markedly in the past several
decades, while evidence on currency turnover indi-
cates only a moderate acceleration (or even a decel-
eration). It is probable, therefore, that unreported
transactions associated with currency have not risen
as fast as the relative importance of currency out-
standing in the money stock might indicate. However,
the persistent expansion in currency outstanding at a
time of strong incentives to avoid reporting could in-
dicate that unreported activities have been expanding
faster than economic activity generally.
Monetary Control
The rapid increase of currency outstanding in re-
cent years also has implications for economic stability
in addition to the unrecorded direct effects on spend-
ing, production, and employment. It is possible that
flows of currency out of commercial banks could
adversely affect the ability of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem to control the total money stock. A useful frame-
work for analyzing the impact of currency move-
ments on monetary control is provided by the sources
and uses of the monetary base or, more specifically,
the net monetary liabilities of the Federal Reserve
System and the U,S. Treasury.
Sources of the base include the monetary gold
stock, Treasury currency outstanding, member bank
borrowings from Reserve Banks, and Federal Reserve
float (credit extended on checks received but not yet
collected). The largest and dominant source of the
base, however, is Federal Reserve holdings of govern-
ment securities.”’ Fluctuations in the base caused by
irregular movements in the other sources can be read-
~Other more minor factors that must be considered in analyz-
ing the net sources of the base include Treasury cash hold-
ings (having a negative impact), foreign deposits at Re-
sen’e Banks (having a negative impact), other Federal
Reserve assets, other Federal Reserve liabilities, and capital
(having a net negative impact).
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ily offset as soon as detected (usually within one
business day) by System purchases or sales of
government securities. Several factors, such as data
revisions, changes in member bank borrowing (in
responseto credit demands and System purchases and
sales of securities), and the two-week lagged imposi-
tion of reserve requirements (forcing member banks
to obtain reserves by borrowing from Reserve Banks
if not otherwise made available) can prevent the
System from hitting precise base targets within a
month or two. Over a period of several months, how-
ever, the growth rate of the base can be determined
within a narrow range by System purchases and
sales.17 As studies generally have shown, fluctuations
in monetary aggregates over periods of less than three
months have seldom had any measurable effect on
prices, employment, or incomes. Thus, the Federal
Reserve has the ability to adequately control the mag-
nitude and trend of the monetary base by buying
or selling securities in the open market.’8
Analysis of the uses of the baseis more complicated
than an examination of its sources. Although there
are just two uses of the base, currency in circulation
and reserves to support member bank deposits, the
analysis of money determination must go behind
these aggregates. The U.S. monetary system is com-
plicated by the existence of both member and non-
member banks, different classes of member banks,
different reserve requirements on different types of
deposits, and graduated reserve requirements for de~
posits of different amounts. It is thus necessary to
allocate reserves among numerous types of deposits
for both those included in the money stock and those
not included (such as government and time deposits),
as well as to estimate the amount of excess reserves
that the banking system will find expedient to hold.
In addition, a chief factor influencing the amount
of money the banking system can create, given an
increase in the monetary base, is the proportion of
currency to demand deposits that the public desires
to hold. If the public held a fixed amount of currency,
all increases in the supply of monetary base by the
Federal Reserve would remain in the banking system
as reserves and would be reflected entirely in a mul-
tiple change in deposits, the amount depending on
reserve requirement ratios for different types of
deposits.
1T
Albert E. Burger, “Explanation of the Growth of the Money
Stock: 1974-Early 1975,” this Review (September 1975),
pp, 5-10,
~ J~ Emest Tanner, “Lag in Effects of Monetary Policy:
A Statistical investigation,” The American Economic Review
(December 1969), pp. 794-805.
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When currency holdings of the public rise rapidly
as they have in recent years, however, the total mone-
tary expansion from a given monetary base injection
is greatly reduced. This results because an outflow of
currency from banks absorbs an equal amount of re-
serves. With fewer reserves, the deposit-creating po-
tential of the banking system is reduced by some
multiple.
Clearly this increased currency demand must be
considered in determining how much monetary base
must be supplied to achieve a desired increase in the
money stock. Fortunately, the System receives prompt
data on currency outstanding through frequent re-
ports, and trend movements of currency have been
projected fairly accurately by forecasting models.
Hence, prompt action to offset any undesired effects
of currency movements has been possible.
During the seventies, currency holdings of the pub-
lic rose rapidly. Unless offset, this acceleration in the
public’s demand for currency would have caused the
growth rate of the money stock to slow or even to
decline at times. The trend growth rate of the money
stock, however, was more rapid in the seventies than
in any other decade since World War II. During the
l97Os there were periods in which the growth rate of
the money supply slowed long enough to depress the
growth of spending. There is no evidence, however,
that the slower money growth reflected an increased
demand for currency that could not have been off-
set by net System purchases of securities promptly
enough to avoid any material contractive effects on
spending.
Conclusions
The almost steady rise in currency in the past
decade has fostered a controversy over whether it
reflected a tremendous growth in illegal or otherwise
unrecorded activities. Although reliable evidence on
the extent of the subterranean economy is lacking, it
is no secret that numerous unrecorded transactions
take place daily. It also is probable that the volume
of such transactions has been expanding faster than
the volume of recorded transactions. Certainly, greater
tax burdens and additipnal restrictions on legal ac-
tivities provide incentives for an increase in subrosa
pursuits. A number of studies, however, indicate no
pronounced acceleration in unreported activities.
Lack of firm knowledge of the volume of un-
reported transactions does not reduce its economic
importance. The implications of a large, growing, but
unrecorded sector in our society are numerous andFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1980
affect measurements of economic activity and the eco-
nomic policies based on these measurements. For ex-
ample, because much income goes undetected, tax
revenues are smaller than they would be otherwise.’°
Official statistics, which are based on recorded trans-
actions, understate both the true magnitude and
growth rates of sales, income, employment, and pro-
duction. As a result, economic policies are more apt
19See Peter M. Cutmann, “Taxes and the Supply of National
Output, Financial Analy,t Journal (November/December
1979), pp. 64-66.
to exacerbate inflation than if all activities were
reported.
Unusually rapid growth in currency outstanding,
given our monetary system, can potentially contract
the total money stock (demand deposits plus cur-
rency). Nevertheless, since information on currency
movements into andout of banks is current, and since
offsetting transactions can be made by the FederalRe-
serve within a brief period, potentially depressing
effects on the economy from this source have been
avoided.
17